

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 04-05-2009			2. REPORT TYPE FINAL			3. DATES COVERED (From - To)		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Interdicting Pakistani Cross Border Sanctuary			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER					
			5b. GRANT NUMBER					
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER					
6. AUTHOR(S) LCDR Caleb N. Risinger, USN Paper Advisor: LTC Michael W. Rauhut, USA			5d. PROJECT NUMBER					
			5e. TASK NUMBER					
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER					
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER					
			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)					
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)					
			12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <i>For Example: Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.</i>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.								
14. ABSTRACT This research paper seeks to address the operational plans and employment methods necessary to fulfill the stated U.S. policy objectives of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating insurgents within Afghanistan and Pakistan. This paper focuses on ISAF's RC-East (International Security Assistance Force's Regional Command East) that not only contains the bulk of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan but borders the most relevant insurgent areas in neighboring Pakistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This paper broadly reviews factors that have contributed to the insurgents' use of the FATA as a sanctuary; namely, historical semi-autonomous governance, influx of Afghan refugees and Mujahedeen basing during the Soviet-Afghan war, and economic sociopolitical disparity between the area and other regions of Pakistan. Following an examination of the FATAs characteristics the paper describes the prominent FATA based insurgencies. In order to defeat insurgents in Afghanistan, CJTF-101 must degrade the use of the FATA as an insurgent sanctuary by conducting covert operations and population security operations.								
15. SUBJECT TERMS								
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 26	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Chairman, JMO Dept			
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 401-841-3556			

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.**

Interdicting Pakistani Cross Border Sanctuary

by

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LCDR, USN

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

04 MAY 2009

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ABSTRACT

This research paper seeks to address the operational plans and employment methods necessary to fulfill the stated U.S. policy objectives of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating insurgents within Afghanistan and Pakistan. This paper focuses on ISAF's RC-East (International Security Assistance Force's Regional Command East) that not only contains the bulk of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan but borders the most relevant insurgent areas in neighboring Pakistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This paper broadly reviews factors that have contributed to the insurgents' use of the FATA as a sanctuary; namely, historical semi-autonomous governance, influx of Afghan refugees and Mujahedeen basing during the Soviet-Afghan war, and economic sociopolitical disparity between the area and other regions of Pakistan. Following an examination of the FATA's characteristics the paper describes the prominent FATA based insurgencies. In order to defeat insurgents in Afghanistan, CJTF-101 must degrade the use of the FATA as an insurgent sanctuary by conducting covert operations and population security operations.

INTRODUCTION

U.S. commanders in Afghanistan are currently fighting insurgent groups based in Pakistan. The Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) in Pakistan provides sanctuary for several insurgent groups fighting both in Pakistan and in Afghanistan. The FATA is a historically ungoverned area within Pakistan and has been a difficult area for either U.S. or Pakistan forces to employ military force effectively to interdict and degrade insurgent groups. The FATA is comprised of seven agencies (Khyber, Kurram, Bajaur, Mohmand, Orakzai, North and South Waziristan) and additional Frontier Regions (Peshawar, Kohat, Tank, Bannu, Lakki, and Dera Ismail Khan) comprised of numerous Pashtun tribes that share a common culture and language with fellow Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan.¹

There are two events that have contributed to the current insurgencies use of the FATA as a sanctuary. First, the semi-autonomous status of the region created by the unique judicial system established by the British has created ungoverned or loosely governed areas. Two, the Soviet-Afghan war resulted in a huge influx of refugees to the FATA that created a readily available recruiting and support base for the Mujahedeen the forerunner of the insurgencies we face today.²

Following the U.S. invasion in 2001, insurgents, many formerly Mujahedeen, once again began using the FATA as a sanctuary for operations into Afghanistan. While the Soviets were cautious not to risk war with Pakistan by invading FATA and other border areas, so too the U.S. has been cautious not to alienate or weaken a needed ally by using overwhelming force to interdict insurgent areas in Pakistan.³ To date military forays by Pakistan and, to a much lesser extent, U.S. forces (via ground but primarily UAV assets)

have not produced the desired effects. As we move forward with a new U.S. Presidential Administration and a renewed focus on the fight in Afghanistan and Pakistan, we must consider new operational models to achieve victory. This work focuses on “military operational solutions” informed by lessons from past conflict in which we contended with operational sanctuary situations. Despite the focus of this work, it must be conceded that long term stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan will not be solved solely by militarily force; but rather, the solution requires careful integration of military, social, economic, and political factors. It falls to CENTCOM and CJTF-101 to provide the military solutions and forces to effectively combat the insurgencies active within the FATA and Afghanistan. CJTF-101, constituting U.S. forces in RC-East (reference figure 1), must degrade the insurgent areas in the FATA by conducting covert operations and population security operations.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The FATA has come to serve as a sanctuary for insurgent groups fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan due to the legacy of British influence and the Soviet invasion. Military planners need to appreciate the historical significance of the FATA and its role as a buffer between Afghanistan and what was formerly British India prior to Pakistan independence. FATA was a key part of the British plan for extending their influence into Afghanistan and checking Russian influence; a period of colonial expansion known as the “Great Game.” The British were fearful of Russian expansion southward from Central Asia and were concerned that Afghanistan, the only geographic buffer between British India and Russia, did not have a defined boundary. In 1893 the border was fixed as the Durand Line, named for Lord Durand who brokered the agreement. The Durand Line established the border very close to the present boundaries between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The

significance of the Durand Line is that it allowed the FATA to develop as a semi-autonomous region under British influence and administration. The border region that became the FATA was never governed or influenced to the degree of British India. Consequently it developed very differently from the provinces and districts to its east under the Federal Crimes Regulations (FCR) instituted as the judicial system by the British.

The British established the FCR as the judicial and administrative system for the entire FATA in 1901, as an attempt to integrate British law with that of pre-existing tribal law. The FCR has remained virtually intact as the system of governance for the FATA to the present and allows for tribal autonomy but requires tribal responsibility for unlawful action. FCR's enduring legacy in the FATA has been minimal government interference, minimal political representation, and a corresponding lag in development and sense of inclusion within Pakistan. Economic and social inclusion within Pakistan has been almost nonexistent, such that today, the FATA is the poorest and most uneducated area of Pakistan with 60% of the population below the national poverty line and a meager literacy rate of 17.42%.⁴ Economic disparity and political disenfranchisement by the government of Pakistan are two factors that may induce popular support for the insurgencies.⁵

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 served as the second significant event that contributed to the use of the FATA as an insurgent sanctuary. Soviet reasons for invading Afghanistan were complex but primarily revolved around disapproval of the communist Afghan governments failing leadership and missteps.⁶ The insurgency that developed to fight the Soviets was known collectively as the Mujahedeen, although it would be composed of seven major factions and many lesser factions. The Mujahedeen and Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) established a smuggling network at key points

along the western border of Pakistan in the FATA. The Mujahedeen received their arms and supplies from about 50 bases located just inside Pakistan, many of which were in the FATA.⁷ Around 40% of the supplies for the entire guerilla effort came through the Parrots' Beak (reference figure 2) and another 20% through the Miram Shah area (located just east of Khowst Province).⁸ To counter cross border supply, the Soviets established a series of border posts to seal the border and interdict supply routes into Afghanistan. The expanse of the border and terrain, however, made interdicting the endless number of supply routes impossible. "It was rather like a person trying to shut off a large tap by putting his hand over it."⁹ The U.S. finds itself with its "hands on the tap" trying to interdict cross border supply via a similar border post system. While the U.S. has had the marginal advantage of a Pakistani ally to help interdict insurgent basing and supply in FATA, the end result has not been much better than that of the Soviets.

INSURGENT GROUPS

The two major insurgent groups utilizing the FATA as a sanctuary are the Afghani and Pakistani Taliban. The major insurgent group active within the CJTF-101 Joint Operations Area (JOA) in Afghanistan is the Haqqani Network (Afghani Taliban faction) although other insurgent groups (notably Hezb-e-Islami Gulbiddin or HIG) are also very active in areas in the northeast. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, Pakistan Taliban faction) are primarily active in Pakistan but have also provided their support to their Afghan counterparts in the Afghani Taliban.¹⁰

The major Afghani Taliban faction within the FATA is commonly known as the Haqqani network (HQN), after its charismatic leader Jaluddin Haqqani. Haqqani leads the

primary Taliban forces in eastern Afghanistan (particularly the provinces of Khowst, Paktia, Paktika, and Gardez). The HQN is based in the vicinity of Miram Shah (approx 10 miles from AF-PK border) in the North Waziristan Tribal Agency and has been responsible for most of the attacks in eastern Afghanistan. An example of their reach and significance is the Kabul Hotel attack conducted in January 08.¹¹

The Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan – TTP) was created in late 2007 and quickly gained recognition for its fight with the Pakistani military. The aims and goals for the TTP are threefold: 1) uniting all pro-Taliban groups within the FATA and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP); 2) assisting the Afghani Taliban in their fight with ISAF and Afghan government forces; and 3) creating an Islamic state modeled after the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Recent fighting in the Swat and Buner districts of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), approximately 60 miles northwest of Islamabad, highlights the dangers posed by the TTP to the government of Pakistan (reference figure 2). At the forefront of the risk from a destabilized Pakistan is the realization that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal could be at risk of falling into the hands of Islamic extremists.¹²

VIETNAM COUNTERINSURGENCY MODELS

Covert and population security operations in Southeast Asia serve as effective models for current operational planners looking at attacking the sanctuaries for the HQN, TTP, and the HIG in the FATA. The training/employment of indigenous forces and combined SOF/CIA partnerships are significant features of operations in Southeast Asia. In both Laos and Vietnam, the combined SOF and CIA personnel successfully trained host nation forces for operations to interdict Vietcong and North Vietnamese areas of sanctuary in Laos,

Cambodia, and North Vietnam. To effectively secure border areas and lines of communication the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) and Combined Action Platoon (CAP) programs were initiated combining U.S. and indigenous personnel to defend and secure local areas. These operations constituted a two pronged approach at attacking sanctuary. Covert operations interdicted cross border sanctuaries and basing areas; while population security operations defended South Vietnamese border areas and denied these areas to the insurgency.

Operation White Star was a joint Special Forces (SF) and CIA operation that was a small part of an ongoing covert theatre of operations for the war in Vietnam. Over a ten year period starting in 1959 SF/CIA teams and later solely CIA personnel trained and equipped Laotian forces to fight and oppose communists in Laos.¹³ Operation White Star (1959-1962) was a successful operation that enabled the Royal Laotian Forces to fight the North Vietnamese backed Pathet Loa insurgency to a stalemate and negotiated settlement in the Geneva Accords of 1962. Operation White Star was significant because it demonstrated that a counterinsurgency could be won by U.S. - trained forces. It laid the groundwork for future CIA and SOF partnership, and provided the core group of trained SF personnel for follow on covert operations in Vietnam.

SF personnel involved in Operation White Star were some of the most experienced and legendary members within SF history and would rely on their valuable experience gained in Laos for SOF operations in Vietnam as part of the Special Operations Group (SOG).¹⁴ SOG was chartered to attack two operational centers of gravity for the North Vietnamese: 1) internal security and regime control within North Vietnam; and 2) bases of operation (logistical, command and control, and staging areas) within Laos and Cambodia. To achieve

their objectives, SOG was organized into divisions centered on four operational approaches; agent operations and deception, psychological warfare, maritime interdiction and commando operations, and cross border interdiction against the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Operation Shining Brass was a series of cross border operations into Laos conducted by SOG beginning in 1965. Using combined SF and indigenous Vietnamese forces, teams conducted reconnaissance of the Ho Chi Minh trail and the cross-border areas to develop future operations (in many cases airstrikes). Follow-on strikes targeted these areas in Laos to deny them to the North Vietnamese as basing and staging points.¹⁵ Building upon the success of Shining Brass, SOG extended operations to Cambodia, which were code-named Daniel Boone.¹⁶ SOG focused on attacking the enemy sanctuary outside of South Vietnam's borders. Population security measures as practiced in Vietnam were developed to deny the insurgency sanctuary inside South Vietnam's borders.

The physical security and protection of the local populace are crucial components of population security. Population security denies an insurgency maneuver space by protecting the populace from intimidation, recruitment, and exploitation. Two methods of population security were employed during Vietnam; forced removal/relocation of the inhabitants and strengthened local defense. By far the most effective approach was that of bolstering the defense of a community in place. Attempts at removing Vietnamese civilians from areas of insurgent activity (such as the Strategic Hamlet Program) were a failure that alienated the populace and undermined support for the South Vietnamese and U.S. forces.¹⁷ The CIDG, developed by the CIA, and the CAP program, implemented by the USMC in central Vietnam, are two examples of successful population security programs using a local defense approach and indigenous forces.

The CIDG, launched in 1961 by the CIA, was developed to organize ethnic minorities within the South Vietnamese highlands into local militias to fight Viet Cong (VC) intimidation and recruitment efforts, in an attempt to deny VC maneuver space and support along the central highlands border. The program was so successful that it continued to expand as the war escalated and was eventually turned over to Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) in 1965.¹⁸ The impact and success of the program was phenomenal considering the relatively small number of personnel it required. A force of approximately 2,500 advisors effectively trained and organized a fighting force of approximately 55,000. CIDG units provided tactical intelligence, patrolled the border, interdicted enemy forces infiltrating from Laos and Cambodia, and denied large areas of central South Vietnam to the enemy.¹⁹ The CIDG program was successful by developing a robust indigenous force capable of defending their local area and denying its use to the insurgency. CAP would be very similar in its approach to local defense but would be initiated not by SF personnel but by Marines on a voluntary basis.²⁰

The CAP, developed and implemented by the USMC in 1965, is another successful example from Vietnam of population security. The CAP was the brain child of General Walt, the USMC commander in the northern zone of Vietnam, and integrated small USMC units with local popular forces based on the model of USMC operations in Central America.²¹ A CAP (14-15Marines and a Navy Corpsman) was integrated with a Popular Force platoon of approximately 35 men into a local fighting force to protect a village. Marines in the CAP, not only worked closely with the Popular Forces within a village but over time through constant contact with villagers became an integral part of the village population interacting with the populous on a daily basis. In addition to the security provided

to the village, Marines conducted numerous civil action projects and Navy Corpsmen trained Popular Forces platoon counterparts and conducted medical civil action program (MEDCAP) evolutions. In order to foster coordination and cooperation the leadership of both the Marines and Popular Forces platoon enjoyed a co-equal status. Participation by the Marines in the CAP was on a volunteer basis and every marine was trained before joining a Combined Action Platoon. Training for CAP Marines consisted of Vietnamese cultural awareness, language skills, and obsolete weapons training (Popular Forces Platoons often relied on WWII weapons and were trained by the Marines). CAP's effectively denied the enemy maneuver space, recruits, and local logistical support and established robust intelligence collection networks to support offensive operations. Gen Krulak, an ardent proponent of the CAP initiative, summed up the effectiveness of the program in *First to Fight*. In this writing, Gen. Krulak describes how the program enabled the local populace to fight the enemy and denotes a revealing metric for the success of the program. Once a village had been protected by a Combined Action unit it never reverted to the control of the enemy.²²

Covert and population security operations in Vietnam provide a good model for successful employment of indigenous forces and the effectiveness of joint SOF/CIA operations. The successes of both covert operations and population security in Vietnam are laudable and worthy of study but no less worthy of study are the lessons derived from failure.

SOG, CIDG, and CAP all had their limitations and shortcomings. Collectively none of these operations was integrated into the overall war strategy and as such the effectiveness of the operations was not as far reaching as they should have been. This constitutes a lesson for planners today as they also seek to employ both conventional and Special Operations

Forces (SOF). SOG operated for much of its existence under very strict limitations, ROE, and extreme micromanagement on the part of political figures both in Southeast Asia (Ambassadors in Vietnam and Laos) and stateside.²³ Fear of political consequences, led to mission disapproval or delayed approval. Unreasonable expectations on the part of political leadership served to set some SOG operations up for failure from the outset. CIDG and CAP were hampered by conventional Army disapproval based on the idea that they were a distraction to larger conventional operations and were a waste of resources.²⁴

Limitations and shortcomings identified during Vietnam serve as valuable lessons learned that can be mitigated by current planners. Current planners should develop operations that integrate covert operations and population security into an overall operational plan for success. These programs should be recognized for their potential and given adequate autonomy and appropriate operational restrictions. Most importantly, leadership (both political and military) must understand that these operations are not a quick fix but rather a systematic long term tool to aid in achieving victory (this is especially true of covert operations).²⁵ It is something that I'm not sure the two sides will ever reconcile and will clearly be based not only on the personalities of the leadership involved but by the political landscape and the characteristics inherent to the battlefield at that time. The time constraints or term limits placed on the executive and to a lesser degree the legislative branches of government are often incompatible with the long term demands of the counterinsurgency fight. Leadership must recognize this feature of covert operations and population security and understand what is possible and what is not or face possible mission failure as history shows us.

CONCLUSIONS

Covert action and population security are not new counterinsurgency operations but rather time tested and proven options for operational planners. While operational problems faced in Afghanistan are not the mirror image of those in Vietnam; Vietnam does offer valuable lessons on how to conduct covert operations and implement population security at an operational level in Afghanistan and the FATA. Degrading the FATA remains the key to effectively securing our objectives of defeating the insurgencies. This objective will not be achieved in the short term, and military force alone is not the solution. Military force, however, is needed as part of a simultaneous employment of social, political, and economic development. Despite the presence of Pakistani military forces within the FATA, the geographic characteristics of the area are conducive to cross-border, covert action. The ability to conduct effective operations covertly in the remote areas of the FATA would likely make covert action an attractive option to policy makers and planners in both the U.S. and Pakistan. The effectiveness and contributions that covert operations and population security provided in past conflicts cannot be overstated.

Opposing options to the use of U.S. military force (covertly, overtly, and clandestine) to interdict and degrade the insurgency in FATA are largely confined to independent operations by Pakistani forces, cooperative operations with Pakistani forces, and physically securing the border. Pakistani forces have conducted major operations within the FATA since 2003 but have had mixed success. 8,000 Pakistani regular forces entered the FATA and began operations against the Taliban in 2003. Over time the Pakistani force commitment was intensified to a high of 80,000.²⁶ Pakistani forces conducted operations in both North

and South Waziristan and raided the compound of Jaluddin Haqqani. To their credit, the Pakistani's also acknowledged the social and economic factors contributing to the insurgency and used investment and development programs in conjunction with military force.²⁷ To what extent these promises were kept, however, is hard to determine. Prolonged conflict between Pakistani military and the Taliban insurgents ended in negotiated settlement and ceasefire agreements that were planned to end cross border attacks by the Taliban. Despite these agreements negotiated by Pakistan in exchange for cessation of hostilities, ISAF forces noted a substantial increase of cross-border insurgent activity in the wake of the agreements.²⁸ While military operations by Pakistan did not result in total defeat of the Taliban, the decreased cross-border activity during this period clearly showed the effectiveness of their operations.

Yet, the overall attractiveness of relying on Pakistan to effectively fight and win against the insurgencies in the FATA cannot be favorable when viewed in the light of recent Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) expansion into areas within central Pakistan.²⁹ In short, recent ineffectiveness of Pakistan to check the TTP advances, taken in conjunction with the unstable political climate, leaves U.S. planners with few options but to plan for U.S. operational solutions to Pakistan's problems. Combined operations with Pakistan may still be a viable option and are a key strategy of the new administration, but past experience has shown that this process may not be as easy as officials presume. Still, there are promising developments worth noting. U.S. and Pakistan agreed to cooperate on solutions to the FATA as late as 2008, agreeing to jointly (Afghan, Pakistan, and NATO troops) manned border posts.³⁰ Another encouraging initiative is the increased intelligence sharing via joint intelligence centers; one of which became operational in March 2008 with five more planned

for the future.³¹ The strategy outlined by the White House has continued this trend and pledges even further cooperation with Pakistan.³² Due to the recent spread of radical Islamic militarism outside of the FATA to neighboring NWFP and SWAT, it is in Pakistan's interest to cooperate and act with more resolve.

Physically securing the Afghanistan-Pakistan border has often been suggested as an alternative to U.S. military operations in Pakistan.³³ This seemingly obvious solution to cross border insurgent infiltration unfortunately physically can't be done with the forces projected to operate in Afghanistan and would not be favored by the local population if forces were allocated. The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan stretches roughly 1,500 miles and is composed of numerous stretches of remote and mountainous terrain; posing a daunting task to closure.³⁴ U.S. forces in many places have occupied pre-existing or constructed new forward operating bases (FOBs) to help interdict insurgent border activity but it has proven to be a stop gap at best and much like the Soviet experience a failure because of the factor of too much space and too little force.

At present, it seems that SOF and CIA elements are over pursuing direct action operations to target insurgent leadership. While targeting of leadership disrupts the enemies command and control and provides invaluable intelligence, let us also not forget the merits of more traditional SOF capabilities such as interdiction, sabotage, deception, and psychological warfare. If allowed to operate within properly constructed, but not overly restrictive parameters, joint SOF/CIA and indigenous operations provide a viable option for degrading insurgent use of the FATA without undue alienation of the Pakistani Government or the local tribal population.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To what extent covert operations in both Afghanistan and Pakistan are being conducted at this time is unknown.³⁵ Arguably population security efforts continue in the form of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Despite the execution of covert operations and the PRTs civil projects, real positive change remains elusive.

Current, U.S. efforts remain limited to direct action operations by ground forces and UAV strikes focused on killing/capturing high value individuals (HVIs).³⁶ What is needed is, both an increase in cross border covert operations and a new emphasis on more traditional SOF mission sets. While such actions would potentially risk political ramifications for both the U.S. and Pakistani leadership these risks would have to be weighed in light of the long term objectives of stability in the region. The sum use of such highly trained and capable units should not be limited to targeting HVIs and conducting a limited amount of foreign internal defense (FID). CJTF-101 should create a new SOF TF with the task of attacking insurgent bases of operation in the FATA. The TF should conduct agent operations, deception, psychological warfare, and interdiction of insurgent areas within the FATA. Notable areas for potential cross border operations include locations in North and South Waziristan and Kurram, targeting key HQN logistical and command and control nodes. In order to reduce the U.S. military footprint, the TF should be integrated with an indigenous Pashtun force based either in Afghanistan or with tacit approval of Pakistan within the FATA (or another operationally viable location in western Pakistan). The Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force composed of local tribesman with Pakistani military leadership, could be a viable indigenous force if properly trained and integrated with SOF personnel. The Frontier

Corps are based throughout the FATA along strategic routes in keeping with their original mission of keeping the peace and quickly quelling tribal violence during British rule.³⁷

Implemented with operationally sound restrictions, sufficient autonomy of action, and reasonable operational objectives; covert operations in the FATA would decrease significantly insurgent activity within eastern Afghanistan.

Population security as practiced in Afghanistan on a limited basis via PRT teams and FOBs are inadequate at providing true population security. The PRTs are too few in number to have the same net effect on a very concentrated area as a program like the CIDG or CAP efforts in Vietnam. In addition, the focus of the PRT is civil reconstruction rather than actual protection. In key border provinces (Khowst, Paktika, and Nangarhar), a program similar to the CIDG program, should be implemented by select SF personnel as this is their primary mission capability. SF units based within key villages should be organized and integrated into an overall expanded PRT program to provide not only increased physical security but wider access to civil improvement. SF personnel will begin creating and training local paramilitary forces that, when located in border areas, could serve to interdict cross border enemy operations and provide invaluable intelligence. Following the proven success of the program, it can be expanded as necessary and manned by selected conventional force personnel appropriately trained on a “CAP like” model. The newly implemented Patrol Base (PB) in the Multi-National Division Center (MND-C) Iraq, may offer a viable “CAP like” model for implementation in Afghanistan. The PB is described as a new “form of maneuver” that bases combat units not at the FOB but rather “among the population” in order to seize the initiative. PB forces are able to conduct persistent security operations and interact daily with the local population.³⁸

In closing, the integration of covert operations and population security into an overall strategy to degrade the insurgencies within the FATA must be implemented by CENTCOM and CJTF-101. Depending on Pakistan to make significant progress in the short term is not a likely scenario. Likewise, conducting joint operations against the Afghan Taliban is less likely when Pakistan now faces an expanding home grown Taliban in the TTP. In addition, any large visible U.S. military presence within the FATA would erode any vestiges of local opposition to the insurgencies, imperil the Pakistan government, and damage international support for U.S./ISAF operations in Afghanistan.³⁹ Integrated covert operations and population security remain a viable option for the military planner faced with few options of affecting an insurgency based across international borders.




Figure 1: ISAF Regional Command and PRT Distribution. (Adapted from ISAF's homepage, http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf, accessed 03 May 2009)



Figure 2: NPR map for the FATA and surrounding areas (Adapted from the illustration on the NPR website and article by Jackie Northman, "Pakistan's Tribal Areas Provide Haven for Militants," <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=101880188>, accessed 03 May 2009)

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²⁴ Clarke, 180-181.

²⁵ Shultz, 310-317.

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³² White House Foreign Policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan, "White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan," www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf (accessed 31 Mar 09).

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³⁵ Ibid, 7-8.

³⁶ http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/washington/10military.html?_r=3&hp&oref=slogin 13 Apr 09

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³⁹ Abbas, 7-8.

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